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HS Article covers cases from 170 S.W.3d through 200 S.W.3d
which the authors believed were noteworthy. The authors acknowl-
I edge the assistance of the following attorneys for their initial review
and drafting of portions of this article: Michael Aguilar, Reed Artim, Tom
Bingman, Jeanne Caruselle, Lorin Combs, Courtney Davis, Kallie Doerr,
Tami Feigl, Noelle Garsek, Amber Garrison, Brad Geier, Katie Kildebeck,
Josh Lebar, Jeff Livingston, Jim Lloyd, Tommy Mann, Jeff Matthews,
Brian Memory, James Nowlin, Travis Phillips, Nick Pyka, Brooke Reyn-
olds, Monique Saulter, Tracey Scoggin, Michelle Simpkins, David Staas,
John Mark Stephens and Jason Whitcomb.
I. MORTGAGES, LIENS, AND FORECLOSURES
There were three notable cases relating to tax sales during the Survey
period. One case deals with attorneys' fees, another case analyzes the
rights of a lienholder after it redeems the property, and the final case
discusses lien priority issues of an unrecorded deed of trust.
In Davis v. Kaufman County,1 the Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed
the maximum amount an attorney may receive in fees from the proceeds
of a tax sale when the property was owned by multiple parties. This was a
case of first impression. When property taxes became delinquent, the
taxing district seized the property and sold it at a tax sale. The sale re-
sulted in excess proceeds of $28,024.91. Four of the property owners, ex-
cluding the appellant, retained an attorney to represent them in the
proceedings to distribute the excess funds. The four owners' attorney
filed a motion to enter judgment that included $3,500 as attorney fees.
Appellant filed a response, claiming in part that the attorney was not en-
titled to such fees because the Texas Tax Code limited the attorney fees to
$1,000 or twenty-five percent of the award, whichever was less.2
The court of appeals found that Section 34.04 of the Texas Tax Code
governs the distribution of excess proceeds from tax sales. 3 Specifically, a
fee charged to obtain excess proceeds for an owner may not be greater
than twenty-five percent of the amount obtained or $1,000, whichever is
less. 4 The court described the question before it as whether, in a distribu-
tion of excess proceeds to multiple owners, the fee for obtaining the pro-
ceeds for multiple owners is capped at twenty-five percent or $1,000 for
the entire fund, or at twenty-five percent or $1,000 for each owner.5 The
court of appeals concluded that the language authorized a charge of up to
twenty-five percent or $1,000 for each owner of the property for whom
the person charging the fee obtained the excess proceeds.6 Since there
1. 195 S.W.3d 847 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
2. Id. at 848-49.
3. Id. at 849.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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were multiple owners of the property, the attorney was entitled to the
lesser of $7,006.23 (twenty-five percent of $28,024.91) or $1,000 from each
owner.7 The court of appeals, therefore, upheld the $3,500 award to the
attorney.8
UMLIC VP LLC v. T&M Sales and Environmental Systems, Inc.9 in-
volved determining the ownership rights of a real property lienholder af-
ter the lienholder redeemed the property following a tax sale. In July of
1989, T&M Sales and Environmental Systems, Inc. ("T&M") obtained a
small business loan from the Small Business Administration ("SBA").
The note was secured by a deed of trust on land owned by T&M. The last
payment T&M made on the note was on November 19, 1998, leaving
$49,602.24 of unpaid principal. On October 15, 1999, UMLIC VP LLC
("UMLIC") purchased the note, the deed of trust and the other related
loan documents from the SBA. The local taxing authorities then fore-
closed on the property because of unpaid property taxes on February 1,
2000, with Pablo Gonzales acquiring the property at the sheriff's sale for
$10,000. On June 6, 2000, UMLIC redeemed the property from Gonzalez
for $12,500 (the $10,000 purchase price plus the statutory twenty-five per-
cernt penalty) and received a special warranty deed for the property. 10
After sending T&M a notice to vacate the property, UMLIC offered to
allow T&M to redeem the property if T&M paid the balance of the note.
T&M did not accept and UMLIC filed a forcible detainer action. T&M
countered by tendering a $12,500 cashier's check to UMLIC, which UM-
LIC refused. UMLIC sold the property by private sale on March 6, 2002
to LSS Investments, Inc. for $66,000. UMLIC did not credit the amount
received from LSS Investments, Inc. against the balance due on the note.
UMLIC sued T&M to collect the unpaid note balance and T&M counter-
claimed. The jury found against UMLIC and for T&M on its wrongful
foreclosure claim. On appeal, UMLIC argued that when it redeemed the
property from the purchaser at a tax sale, it became vested with fee sim-
ple title and thus had the right to subsequently sell the property in a pri-
vate sale rather than to initiate public foreclosure proceedings.11
The court of appeals construed section 34.21 of the Texas Tax Code,
which provides that when a property is sold at a tax sale, the deed pur-
chased vests good and perfect title in the purchaser and that purchaser's
assigns, including the right to the use and possession of the property, sub-
ject only to the former owner's right of redemption. 12
While the court of appeals agreed with UMLIC's argument that a pur-
chaser of property at a tax sale would receive the purchaser's good and
perfect title, it distinguished between the rights obtained by purchasing
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 176 S.W.3d 595 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied).
10. Id. at 602-03.
11. Id. at 603, 605.
12. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.21 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
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property from a tax sale winner and redeeming the property. 13 UMLIC
did not purchase the property from Gonzalez; rather, it exercised its stat-
utory right of redemption. Therefore, the court of appeals found the is-
sue to be much narrower: What title does a mortgagee 14 hold after it
redeems property under the redemption statute?' 5
The court of appeals found that, unlike a purchase, the right of re-
demption does not establish new title; it restores the parties to the posi-
tion they were in before the tax lien.16 Where a co-owner redeems
property from a tax sale, courts have concluded that it does not divest the
other owner of its ownership rights in the property.17 The court of ap-
peals concluded that UMLIC's security interest in the property made it
eligible as an "owner" under the redemption statute to exercise redemp-
tion rights. 18 However, the court of appeals also found that the designa-
tion of owner under the redemption statute also prevented UMLIC from
divesting a co-owner of its interest in the property.' 9 The redemption
only paid the taxes and discharged the property of the tax lien. Title to
the property remained as it was before the tax sale.20 Therefore, the only
interests that UMLIC retained after the redemption were those set forth
in the deed of trust.21 The court of appeals upheld the trial court, holding
that UMLIC did not obtain fee simple title through redemption. 22
ABN AMRO Mortgage Group v. TCB Farm and Ranch Land Invest-
ments23 concerned the priority of a lien after a tax sale when the instru-
ment creating the lien was not timely recorded. On September 6, 2002,
the landowners refinanced a loan secured by real property with ABN
AMRO Mortgage Group ("ABN"). The new deed of trust with ABN
was not recorded until October 7, 2003. When the landowners became
delinquent in the payment of property taxes, they arranged for payment
of those taxes by Genesis Tax Loan Services, Inc. ("Genesis"). The land-
owners executed an Affidavit Authorizing Transfer of Tax Lien and a
Deed of Trust in favor of Genesis, and the Denton County Tax Collector
executed a certificate of transfer of tax lien in favor of Genesis. Such
Deed of Trust and certificate of transfer of tax lien were recorded on
September 23, 2003, approximately two weeks before ABN filed its deed
of trust. When the landowners filed for bankruptcy, Genesis posted for a
13. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.21(e), (e)( 2) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005). Under a right
to redemption, an owner may redeem the property by paying the purchaser the amount bid
for the property, the deed recording fee, and any taxes, penalties, interest or costs on the
property, plus a premium of twenty-five percent. § 34.21(3)( 2).
14. Any person (including a lienholder) who has any interest in lands sold for taxes is
considered an "owner" under the tax redemption statute. § 34.21.
15. UMLIC, 176 S.W.3d at 607.
16. Id. at 606.
17. Id. at 607.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 608.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 200 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).
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nonjudicial foreclosure sale and notified all parties claiming an interest,
including ABN. TCB Farm and Ranch Land Investments ("TCB")
bought the property at the foreclosure sale. Both TCB and Genesis then
rejected ABN's subsequent attempt to redeem the property. ABN
brought suit against Genesis for wrongful foreclosure and against TCB
for a declaratory judgment. The trial court denied ABN's motion for
summary judgment and quieted title in TCB. 24
At issue in the court of appeals was what a first lien is for purposes of
Texas Tax Code section 32.06(i), which governs the right of redemption
for a property that is sold at a tax sale.25 ABN contended that, under a
liberal interpretation of the Tax Code, as required by Texas law, its lien
was the first lien under section 32.06(i), even though its lien was not filed
of record when the tax lien was transferred to Genesis. TBN argued that
"first lien" undei the statute meant first recorded lien, so that Genesis's
deed of trust lien became first in priority when it was recorded before the
ABN deed of trust.26
The court of appeals rejected TCB's interpretation of section 32.06(i),
as it would have required the court to insert the word "recorded" into the
statute, which it viewed as being contrary to appropriate statutory con-
struction. 27 Additionally, in looking at what constitutes a first lien, the
court of appeals noted that state tax liens are "special liens" which are
senior to other liens, such as the deed of trust lien in this case, but that
such status would not defeat a deed of trust lien as being a valid first
lien.28 While not specifically stated in the opinion, it appears that the
court of appeals was construing the deed of trust lien in favor of Genesis
as having only the same effect as a tax lien would have, since the Genesis
deed of trust lien appears to only have secured the tax lien payment. 29
Consequently, the court of appeals ignored the general law of priority
and effect of a foreclosure by a senior lienholder on the junior
lienholder's interest.30 Further, the court of appeals construed such re-
demption statute to contain no indication that the transfer of a tax lien
converts the tax lien into a "first lien" for purposes of such statute.31
24. Id. at 775-76.
25. Id. at 777. Section 32.06(i) of the Texas Tax Code, in relevant part, reads, "The
person whose property is sold ... or any person holding a first lien against the property is
entitled, within one year after the date the property is sold, to redeem the property from
the purchaser at the tax sale."
26. ABN AMRO, 200 S.W.3d at 778.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 779.
29. The Genesis deed of trust recited: "This Lien is a Transfer Tax Lien Executed
Pursuant to Section 32.06 of the Texas Tax Code. This Lien Is a Superior Lien and Takes
Priority over a Homestead Interest in the Property and Takes Priority over the Claim of
Any Holder of a Lien on Property Encumbered by this Tax Lien." Id. at 776.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 779. The court, in footnote 3, noted that the Texas Constitution classifies a
tax lien as an inextinguishable "special lien" which must be paid to the sovereign and does
not classify it as a first lien. See TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 15.
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TCB further argued that the ABN deed of trust lien should be void as
to Genesis because there was nothing in the record to indicate Genesis's
notice of the ABN deed of trust lien.32 Under the Texas Property Code,
an unrecorded deed of trust is void as to a subsequent creditor who ex-
tends its loan and acquires its lien without notice of the earlier lien.3 3
However, the court of appeals determined that the record affirmatively
established knowledge by Genesis of the existence of the ABN deed of
trust pursuant to the redemption statute and express provisions in the
Genesis deed of trust. 34 Without quoting the exact language, the court of
appeals characterized the Genesis deed of trust as being subject to the
statutory rights of redemption of the owner and first lienholder. 35 The
court opinion contains no recitation of any facts reflecting actual knowl-
edge by Genesis of the ABN deed of trust, and there was no constructive
knowledge by Genesis since the ABN deed of trust was actually recorded
two weeks after the transfer of tax lien was recorded. The recited lan-
guage merely parrots the language of the redemption statute, and in this
author's opinion, does not represent adequate authority of actual knowl-
edge of the existence of a prior deed of trust lien. In further support of its
leap to such a conclusion, the court of appeals launched into an explana-
tion of how a tax sale purchaser always buys with knowledge that his title
may be defeated by redemption and cannot be considered absolute until
the redemption period expires. 36 This seems weak support for the con-
tention that the unrecorded ABN deed of trust constituted a valid first
lien. Nevertheless, the court of appeals concluded that the unrecorded
deed of trust lien of ABN was not extinguished by the tax lien foreclosure
sale and allowed ABN to exercise its right of redemption as a first
lienholder.3 7
Murphy v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 38 deals with the elements
required to effect a forcible detainer action against the owner of the
property after foreclosure under a deed of trust. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc. ("Countrywide") purchased property at a foreclosure sale
under a deed of trust executed by Murphy. The deed of trust was origi-
nally executed in favor of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,
and was subsequently transferred to Countrywide causing the foreclosure
sale to be conducted. 39 The court of appeals reiterated the elements to
sustain a forcible detainer action to include the following elements: (1)
the movant is the owner of the property, (2) the nonmoving party was an
occupant at the time of foreclosure, (3) the foreclosure was of a lien supe-
rior to the right of such occupant's possession, (4) a statutorily sufficient
32. ABN AMRO, 200 S.W.3d at 779.
33. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001(a) (Vernon 2004).
34. ABN AMRO, 200 S.W.3d at 780.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 781.
38. 199 S.W.3d 441 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
39. Id. at 443.
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written demand of possession is made by the movant, and (5) the occu-
pant refused to leave.40 Countrywide prevailed in its proof of such ele-
ments. Concerning elements of ownership, Countrywide attached to its
affidavit for summary judgement the substitute trustee's deed and affida-
vit of mortgage which were recorded in connection with the foreclosure.
The attachment of a certified copy of the deed of trust served as evidence
that Murphy was the occupant at the time of foreclosure. As to the prior-
ity of lien, Countrywide relied on the deed of trust and substitute trus-
tee's deed. Demand for possession was established by attaching the
notice to vacate given by Countrywide to Murphy after the foreclosure
sale.
41
Murphy contended that the attached documents were not authenti-
cated, and should not be sufficient and admissible as evidence; however,
the court of appeals held these documents were self-authenticated under
the auspices of Rule 902(4) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. 42 Murphy
further contended that the evidence did not show Countrywide as the
owner of the lien since the deed of trust was in favor of Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation rather than Countrywide. 43 Nevertheless,
the court of appeals found the introduction of a business records affidavit
of the attorney for Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation sufficient
to authenticate the right of Countrywide, as the authorized servicing
agent for Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, to provide the no-
tice to vacate. 44 In this respect the court of appeals found that Rule 746
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure did not require proof of title by
Countrywide, but only required evidence of ownership to demonstrate a
superior right of possession. 45
Another case dealing with forcible detainer after a foreclosure sale is
Villalon v. Bank One.46 This action arose out of a foreclosure by Bank
One against Villalon and the subsequent forceable detainer action
brought in justice court, retried de novo in county court with a ruling
adverse to Villalon and appealed to the district court. Villalon's position
concerns a question regarding lawful title to the property based on
whether the deed of trust foreclosure was valid, due to alleged violations
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 47 by the creditor's debt collec-
tors.48 In concluding that the forcible detainer action was valid, the court
of appeals noted that the forcible detainer rule is designed to provide
simplicity and swift remedy, and not one for determining title to the prop-
erty.49 The court of appeals reiterated numerous authorities supporting
40. Id. at 445.
41. Id. at 446-47.
42. Id. at 446.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 176 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a), (b) (2006).
48. Villalon, 176 S.W.3d at 68-69.
49. Id. at 70.
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the proposition that proof of title is not required in a forcible detainer
action, but only a showing of evidence of ownership of a superior right is
necessary as a condition to immediate possession.5 0 Furthermore, the
court of appeals noted that the property owner is not so harmed, because
the owner can raise the question of title in an action brought in district
court.5 1 The court of appeals held that the substitute trustee's deed flow-
ing from the foreclosure sale was sufficient to establish ownership and
that the deed of trust was sufficient to establish the landlord/tenant rela-
tionship after foreclosure, for purposes of the forcible detainer rule.
52
Construction of condemnation provisions in a deed of trust was ad-
dressed in Wells Fargo Bank, Minnesota v. North Central Plaza I, L.L.P.5 3
North Central Plaza I (NCPI) purchased 4.45 acres of land, improved
with an office building, along Central Expressway in Dallas, Texas, with
funds from a $14,400,000 loan secured by a deed of trust on the property.
Prior to NCPI's purchase of the property, the State of Texas had com-
menced condemnation proceedings to take 0.1956 acres of property for
use in the Interstate Highway 635 and U.S. Highway 75 interchange con-
struction. The commissioner's condemnation award was made, and NCPI
appealed on June 11, 2002. NCPI subsequently defaulted and the prop-
erty was foreclosed upon on December 3, 2002, in an amount leaving a
deficiency of over $9,000,000. Wells Fargo intervened in the condemna-
tion case to protect its rights to the condemnation awards. 54
Upon jury trial, condemnation awards were granted in the amount of
$875,000 to NCPI. Wells Fargo appealed contending that the applicable
provisions of the Deed of Trust were improperly interpreted by the trial
court. The court of appeals considered two provisions of the deed of
trust: (1) the definition of the mortgaged property, and (2) the condem-
nation provisions. The definition of the mortgaged property included all
condemnation awards except with respect to the Interstate Highway 635/
U.S. Highway 75 interchange condemnation, provided such condemna-
tion did not impair the use or decrease the value of the subject premises
or improvements.5 5 The court of appeals concluded that the only evi-
dence as to valuation following the condemnation came from NCPI's own
appraiser, whose report and testimony evidenced a market value de-
crease of over $5,000,000 by reason of the condemnation. 56 Nevertheless,
NCPI asserted that a specific provision in the condemnation section of
the deed of trust should prevail. Subsection (e) provided that "notwith-
standing any provisions contained in this paragraph ... Trustor shall be
entitled to retain any award paid in connection with the IH 635/U.S.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 194 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
54. Id. at 725.
55. Id. at 725-26.
56. Id.
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Highway 75 interchange condemnation. '57 The court of appeals con-
cluded that the "notwithstanding" language in such subsection (e) re-
ferred to subsections (a) through (d) of the condemnation paragraph and
did not override the granting provisions contained in the definition of
mortgaged property. 58 The court of appeals concluded that the provi-
sions governing the granting of Interstate Highway 635/U.S. Highway 75
condemnation proceeds upon a decrease in the value of the property was
more specific than the general provision that NCPI retained condemna-
tion awards from the Interstate Highway 635/U.S. Highway 75 in-
terchange condemnation.59 Since specific provisions rule over general
provisions, the court of appeals held that Wells Fargo's construction of
these provisions was accurate and that the condemnation awards were
the property of Wells Fargo.60
II. NOTES, LOAN COMMITMENTS,
AND LOAN AGREEMENTS
There were no noteworthy cases during the Survey period.
III. GUARANTIES
Mid-South Telecommications Co. v. Best61 addressed the date of ac-
crual of an action against a guarantor. Mid-South made a loan to
VidiMedix that was guaranteed by Best and Faris. After VidiMedix de-
faulted on the loan, Mid-South demanded payment from the guarantors
and eventually brought suit against them for breach-of-contract when
they refused to perform under the guaranty. The trial court granted
Best's and Faris's cross-motion for summary judgment based on the claim
that the four-year statute of limitations for a suit on debts had expired.
62
The court of appeals affirmed Best's and Faris's claim that Mid-South's
claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations, since four years
had passed since the cause of action accrued.63 The court of appeals ex-
amined the note and guaranty to determine when the event of default
occurred and the breach-of-contract claim accrued against the guarantors.
Based on the language in the guaranty that each of the undersigned guar-
antors severally, unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed the prompt
and complete payment of all amounts [VidiMedix] owed to [Mid-South]
under the Note, the court of appeals determined that the guaranty was an
absolute guaranty solely contingent on the default of the principal obligor
on the note.64 Therefore, the terms in the note were the operative lan-
guage establishing the guarantor's obligation, and the maturity date of
57. Id. at 727.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 728.
60. Id.
61. 184 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, no pet).
62. Id. at 387-89.
63. Id. at 390.
64. Id. at 391.
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the note was the date of accrual of the action against the guarantors
under the guaranty.65 Mid-South contended that accrual of the action did
not occur until the demand letter was sent to the guarantors. However,
the court of appeals concluded that demand was not an integral part of
the cause of action or a condition precedent to Mid-South's right because
the guaranty waived notice of demands for performance.66 Conse-
quently, the date of the accrual of the action against the guarantors was
the maturity date of the Note. 67
.IV. USURY
There were n6 noteworthy cases during the Survey period.
V. DEBTOR/CREDITOR
In Clovis Corp. v. Lubbock National Bank,68 the Amarillo Court of
Appeals considered whether a good faith term could be implied into a
contract provision that did not on its face contain such a term. Clovis and
Diversified Lenders, Inc. executed a Security and Factoring Agreement
setting forth the terms of a factor transaction under which Diversified
would purchase various accounts receivable from Clovis. Shortly after
the agreement was executed, Diversified assigned its interest in the agree-
ment to Lubbock National Bank. Under the terms of the agreement the
Bank could reserve and withhold an amount in a reserve account equal to
twelve and three-quarters percent of the gross face amount of all ac-
counts purchased. The contract further provided that "additional reserve
may be taken when deemed necessary by FACTOR." After the Bank
increased the reserve from twelve and three-quarters percent to seven-
teen and three-quarters percent, Clovis filed suit against the Bank claim-
ing that the Bank acted in bad faith by increasing the reserve. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank and Clovis ap-
pealed. 69 The court of appeals observed that because there was no good
faith term written anywhere in the Security and Factoring Agreement,
Clovis was reading into the agreement an implied term obligating the
Bank to act in good faith.70 The court of appeals noted that the parties
expressly agreed that the reserve could be raised when "deemed neces-
sary by [the] FACTOR," and hence necessity, and not good faith, was the
triggering factor. 71 Because an express provision encompassed when and
how the reserve could be modified, an additional covenant (in this case, a
covenant of good faith) involving the same topic could not be implied.72
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 194 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.).
69. Id. at 718.
70. Id. at 719.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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VI. PURCHASER/SELLER
In Henderson v. Love,73 Henderson agreed to purchase a house from
Love under a contract for deed. At the time of the contract, neither the
contract nor applicable law required an annual accounting statement to
be provided to Henderson by Love. In 2001, changes to section 5.077 of
the Texas Property Code required Love, beginning in January, 2002, to
provide Henderson with an annual report, and imposed liquidated dam-
ages in the amount of $250 per day after January 31 for each year such
report was not provided. Love failed to provide such report and Hender-
son sued, alleging joint and several liability for the daily liquidated dam-
ages. The court determined that section 5.077 of the Texas Property
Code was unconstitutional, as applied in this case.7 4 The Waco Court of
Appeals reversed, ruling that section 5.077 was constitutional and could
support liquidated damages in excess of $750,000. 75 Such a figure stands
in stark contrast to the originally financed $38,500. In its analysis, the
court of appeals turned to chapter .41 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, which covers exemplary damages and noted that since
the penalty provided by section 5.077 was limited by chapter 41, section
5.077 fit within the legislative scheme. 76
In Flores v. Millennium Interests,7 7 the Texas Supreme Court addressed
whether section 5.077(c)'s liquidated damages are owed when a seller de-
livers a timely annual statement that omits some of the information re-
quired by subsection (b) of that statute. The company hired by
Millennium Interests to service its financial transactions was apparently
unaware of the recently enacted disclosure requirements specifically ap-
plicable to executory contracts and accordingly sent the same statements
it used to service traditional mortgage loans. Those statements provided
two of four items of information required by section 5.077(b). 78 The su-
preme court reasoned *that the omissions, while significant, did not
demonstrate a blatant attempt to circumvent the disclosure requirements
as to render the annual statement a nullity, and that the purchaser need
not prove actual harm or injury to recover statutory damages for an in-
complete annual statement. 79
In Coldwell Banker Whiteside Associates v. Ryan Equity Partners,
Ltd.,8 0 Ryan Equity Partners, Ltd. purchased real estate and employed
Coldwell Banker Whiteside Associates as its real estate broker. Ryan
Equity challenged the trial court's finding that the seller of the property
breached the contract by failing to disclose the status of zoning, and the
73. 181 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.)
74. Id. at 812.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 817.
77. 185 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. 2005).
78. Id. at 429-30.
79. Id. at 434.
80. 181 S.W.3d 879 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
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denial to Seller of a Special Use Permit. 81 The Dallas Court of Appeals
noted that the zoning status of the property was not a material defect to
the property within the meaning of the purchase contract, and that denial
of the Seller's application for a Special Use Permit was a determination
of the property's legal status pursuant to the zoning ordinance and not a
material defect to the property.82 Additionally, the court of appeals dis-
posed of Ryan Equity's fraud claim, explaining that Ryan Equity did not
explain why the zoning status and denial of the application for the Special
Use Permit were not discoverable through the exercise of ordinary care,
reasonable diligence, or a reasonable investigation. 83
VII. LEASES; LANDLORD/TENANT
In 4901 Main, Inc. v. TAS Automotive, Inc.,84 TAS accepted occupancy
of leased premises "as is" and acknowledged that the premises were suit-
able for TAS's intended purpose. The lease required TAS to maintain
and repair the premises except for the roof and structure. Main claimed
that TAS waived its right to require Main to repair the roof by virtue of
signing an "as is" lease.85 The Houston Court of Appeals for the Four-
teenth District disagreed and held that an "as is" clause cannot waive
maintenance obligations imposed upon a landlord in the same lease. 86
Krayem v. USRP (PAC), L.P.87 addressed the issue of proper exercise
of a purchase option granted under a lease. In April 2003, Krayem exe-
cuted an agreement to lease a gas station in Irving, Texas, which also gave
Krayem the option to purchase the premises. Less than two months later,
USRP sold the premises to MacArthur Field Center, Inc. In July 2003,
Krayem sent an unsigned letter to his new landlord stating that he was
exercising his option to purchase the premises. In August, MacArthur
sent Krayem a letter terminating his lease for failure to comply with the
lease's insurance requirements. The defendants stated that Krayem's fail-
ure to sign the notice letter meant the notice was ineffective since the
lease required "written irrevocable notice."' 88 The Dallas Court of Ap-
peals held that "written irrevocable notice" does not require such notice
to be signed unless the lease specifically states that all correspondence
and notices be signed by a party. 89
In Zinda v. McCann Street, Ltd.,90 McCann Street, Ltd. owned and op-
erated a restaurant called McCann Street Bar & Grill which Zinda man-
aged and of which he was a limited partner. The other limited partners
81. Id. at 882-84.
82. Id. at 886.
83. Id. at 888.
84. 187 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
85. Id. at 629-30.
86. Id. at 633.
87. 194 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
88. Id. at 92-93.
89. Id. at 94.
90. 178 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. denied).
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were several brothers and sisters of the Smith family. The Smiths learned
that Zinda had taken substantial money out of the business for his per-
sonal use and, as a result, foreclosed upon Zinda's partnership interest.
The Smiths began the process of eviction. Zinda sued the partnership for
exclusion from the business and the Smiths countersued Zinda for unpaid
rent. On appeal, Zinda contended that the partnership did not comply
with section 93.002(f) of the Texas Property Code, because it did not put
a written notice on the restaurant's front door stating where Zinda could
obtain a new key.91 The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that unlike an
absentee landlord situation that would be remedied by posting a formal
notice on the door, there was no evidence that Zinda was harmed by the
failure to post a notice since all parties were fully involved in the proceed-
ings up to the changing of the locks.92 Therefore, the eviction was proper
under the lease and Texas law.93
VIII. TITLE MATTlERS
A. ADVERSE POSSESSION
In Masonic Building Association of Houston, Inc. v. McWhorter,94 the
Houston Court of Appeals for the First District held that although claim-
ant's predecessor in interest did not consciously intend to take the defen-
dant's property when he erected a wooden fence, evidence existed that he
intended to claim the property as his own, used the portion of the prop-
erty to the exclusion of the defendant, and intended to convey the dis-
puted property to his successor in interest, and therefore, intended to
exercise rights to the property that were inconsistent with that of the true
owner. 95 However, the court of appeals rejected claimant's contention
that a hypothetical continuation of an existing fence line, as opposed to
an actual fence or other obstruction, was legally sufficient to establish an
adverse possession claim.96
B. DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES
Interpretation of conveyances and construction of deeds have
prompted courts to apply well-settled law and attempt to harmonize legal
issues that are not so settled. An example of the former can be found in
Johnson v. Driver.97 A 1979 deed from Lillian Edge to Tommy C. String-
field unambiguously recited that Edge "granted, sold, and conveyed" the
property in question "in consideration of ten dollars and other valuable
consideration. ' 98 The court refused to admit affidavits that the deed was
91. Id. at 887-88.
92. Id. at 890.
93. Id.
94. 177 S.W.3d 465 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
95. Id. at 474.
96. Id. at 475.
97. 198 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2006, no pet.).
98. Id. at 361.
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a gift because the deed was not ambiguous on its face. 99 The court stated
that when there is no facial ambiguity, a grantor's mistake as to the legal
effect of what he signed is not the kind of mistake that will avoid the bar
of the parol evidence rule.100 Parol evidence cannot be used to create
ambiguity when the deed itself is unambiguous. Thus, the express, une-
quivocal language of the deed could not be refuted by affidavits. 10 1
Likewise, Centerpoint Energy Houston Electric, L.L.P. v. Old TJC
Co.102 involved two deeds, an original deed and a correction deed. The
original deed expressly reserved only a reversion interest in the subject
property that would be triggered if the grantee ceased to use the land as a
public park. The correction deed granted all "right, title and interest" to
the property to the grantee and failed to reference the public-park-use
restriction.10 3 The Tyler Court of Appeals emphasized that it must har-
monize the provisions of both deeds so that no provision is rendered
meaningless and no single provision is controlling. 10 4 The court of ap-
peals concluded that the granting clause of the correction deed could only
pertain to the reversionary interest reserved in the original deed. 10 5 Fur-
thermore, the correction deed contained a new habendum clause ex-
pressly stating that the grantor shall not have any right or title to the
subject property.10 6 Because the correction deed could be performed as
written, no further clarification was necessary.10 7 Regardless of what the
parties to the transaction meant to say, effect must be given to what the
parties did say. 10 8 The correction deed contained an unambiguous grant-
ing clause and, because the grantor did not seek reformation or allege
fraud, accident, or mistake, the language of the correction deed must be
enforced without consideration of extrinsic evidence. 10 9
C. EASEMENTS
In Cummins v. Travis County Water Control and Improvement Dis-
trict,1 0 the Austin Court of Appeals considered the issue of whether a
conveyance of lakefront property necessarily provided the owner of such
property with littoral or riparian rights, or, alternatively an easement,
any of which would entitle the owners of such property to construct a
recreational boat dock on submerged lands near a drinking water intake
barge. To succeed on a riparian or littoral rights claim, the claimant must
(1) trace title back to a grant from the sovereign prior to 1895, and (2)
99. Id. at 363.
100. Id. at 364.
101. Id.
102. 177 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
103. Id. at 427-29.
104. Id. at 430.
105. Id. at 432.
106. Id. at 433.
107. Id. at 432.
108. Id. at 433.
109. Id. at 434.
110. 175 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied).
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establish that the land borders on a natural lake with a "normal flow" of
water. I 1 The claimants in this case could do neither as their chain of title
extended no further than 1904 and Lake Travis is not a "natural" flow,
but is floodwater. 112 Moreover, the court of appeals determined that
even if the claimants could establish littoral rights, such rights would have
to yield to the state's police power to regulate public trust property, in
this case a two-hundred-foot zone around a public drinking water intake
barge.113 An express easement for ingress and egress, even if it had sur-
vived the chain of title to the claimant, would not have given the claimant
the right to build a recreational boat dock as such was not "reasonably
necessary" for ingress and egress.11 4 Finally, the court of appeals deter-
mined that an easement could not be implied as the claimants had not
been able to demonstrate any previous use of a boat dock (and certainly
not the required "apparent, continuous and necessary" use). 115 In any
event, an easement would not be implied where, as here, its purpose
would be contrary to the public policy interest in preventing recreational
water uses within the protected zone surrounding a public drinking water
intake barge.1 16
D. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, CONDOMINIUMS,
AND OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS
In Montfort v. Trek Resources, Inc.,'1 7 the Eastland Court of Appeals
addressed a mineral estate's duty to provide fresh water to the surface
owners and whether it constituted a covenant running with the land. The
court of appeals found that the use of the phrase "successors and as-
signs," while helpful, was not dispositive in determining whether the par-
ties intended the covenant to run with the land, nor was it necessary to
create a covenant running with the land.118 The court of appeals also
noted that a benefit upon a grantor is not a requirement for a covenant to
run with the land, and that the deed also provided that upon the termina-
tion of the oil and gas lease, Citation or its successors and assigns would
relinquish title to the fresh water rights and the water gathering sys-
tem.' 9 But the deed failed to mention any obligation to relinquish title
to a particular owner.120 The court of appeals interpreted this omission
to mean that the parties contemplated that the original grantee might not
necessarily be the owner of the surface rights at the time the oil and gas
lease terminated. 121
111. Id. at 44-45.
112. Id. at 45.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 51-52.
115. Id. at 61.
116. Id.
117. 198 S.W.3d 344 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, no pet.).
118. Id. at 355.
119. Id. at 356.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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In Wilchester West Concerned Homeowners LDEF, Inc. v. Wilchester
West Fund, Inc.,122 two adjacent homeowners associations circulated peti-
tions throughout their respective neighborhoods, which collected enough
signatures to pass proposed amendments to their respective deed restric-
tions to increase the annual assessments and grant memberships in a
nearby recreational club to all members. Wilchester LDEF filed suit
against the club and both homeowners associations, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the contracts with the club and the amendments to the
deed restrictions were void. The homeowners associations and the club
challenged Wilchester LDEF's standing to bring suit on behalf of the
homeowners, asserting that Wilchester LDEF was not an owner of prop-
erty in either subdivision.123 In finding standing, the court of appeals
noted that the elements of whether an organization has standing to bring
suit include: (1) whether its members have standing to bring suit on their
own behalf; (2) whether the interests the organization seeks to protect
are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim nor
the relief requested requires the participation of the individuals in the
suit.124 However, after a traditional analysis, the court of appeals held
that the homeowners associations had the ability and the authority to ex-
ecute the contract with the club and that the amendments to both sets of
deed restrictions were valid.125
E. HOMESTEAD
In Jordan v. Hagler,126 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a
constructive trust could not be imposed on materials affixed to the
homestead because sections 41.001 and 53.254 of the Texas Property
Code clearly provide that a lien, not a constructive trust, is the only en-
cumbrance that may be placed on a homestead for labor and materials so
long as the person furnishing the material or performing labor executes a
written contract with the owner. 127
In McKee v. Wilson,128 the Waco Court of Appeals held the proper
time to determine whether property is homestead property, for purposes
of satisfying the statutory requirements for mechanic's liens, is the date of
the construction agreement, not the date the lien is filed. 129 Since the
construction contract was entered into at the time the McKees resided in
their prior homestead, the mechanic's lien filed by Wilson on the new
home was not for homestead property.130 Accordingly, the court of ap-
peals determined that the statutory requirements for a mechanic's lien on
122. 177 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
123. Id. at 555.
124. Id. at 561.
125. Id. at 566.
126. 179 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
127. Id. at 220.
128. 174 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet).
129. Id. at 845.
130. Id.
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homestead property was not required.' 3 1
F. TITLE INSURANCE
In Smith v. McCarthy,132 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied the
"eight corners" rule, which states that whether a title company has a duty
to defend is determined only by the allegations in the underlying plead-
ings and the language in the insurance policy, with the allegations in the
pleadings being given a liberal interpretation in favor of the insured, but
without looking outside of the pleadings or reading facts into the plead-
ings in making such a determination. 133 The title company argued that it
was not obligated to defend the Smiths due in part to Schedule B, Excep-
tion 6(g) of the title policy, which excluded coverage for losses and costs
resulting from "rights of parties in possession."'1 34 McCarthy's pleadings
alleged that she was the owner "by adverse possession" of the property in
question, and detailed her continued use of the property over the course
of many years. 135 Therefore, looking at the pleadings and the insurance
policy alone, McCarthy's claims included allegations of possession, a
cause of action which was excluded under the coverage of the Smith's
policy by the parties in possession exclusion, regardless of whether Mc-
Carthy would have actually prevailed on the claim.
136
Similarly in Spurgeon v. Coan & Elliot,13 7 the Eastland Court of Ap-
peals noted that an insurer is only obligated to defend its insured when
the petition contains allegations which come within the scope of the title
policy's coverage.1 38 Spurgeon's title policy excluded from coverage,
among other things, any defects or adverse claims which were created or
agreed to by the insured claimant, or not known to the title company or
recorded in the public records as of the date of the policy, but known to
the insured claimant and not disclosed to the title company. 13 9 The claim
against Spurgeon's property arose from an alleged agreement which was
not of record and of which the title company had no knowledge, which
allegations fell within both such exclusions, regardless of whether or not
the agreement actually existed.' 40
In Holder-McDonald v. Chicago Title Insurance Co.,141 the Dallas
Court of Appeals analyzed the differences between the duties of the title
insurer and the escrow agent. The court of appeals found that Chicago
Title did not breach its fiduciary duty when acting as escrow agent by
attaching an incorrect legal description of the property to the closing doc-
131. Id.
132. 195 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
133. Id. at 307-08.
134. Id. at 308.
135. Id. at 310.
136. Id. at 311.
137. 180 S.W.3d 593 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet.).
138. Id. at 598.
139. Id. at 599.
140. Id.
141. 188 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).
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uments, because the closing instructions to the escrow agent directed the
"Title Company" to determine the correct legal description of the prop-
erty in question, not the escrow agent. 142 The court of appeals stated that
enforcing an independent duty on the escrow agent to ensure the correct-
ness of the legal description prepared by the title insurer would, in effect,
cause the escrow agent to become a second title insurer with unlimited
liability.1 43 The court of appeals similarly found that the escrow agent
could not have breached a fiduciary duty in connection with the delivery
of a second incorrect document, as the document was prepared by Chi-
cago Title as part of its issuance of the title insurance policy, not as part of
the duties of the escrow agent. 144
IX. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS, MECHANICS' LIEN,
AND CONSTRUCTION ISSUES
In Gentry v. Squires Construction, Inc.145 a builder brought suit against
a homeowner for breach of a construction contract and lien foreclosure
or, in the alternative, for quantum meruit. The homeowner countersued
alleging fraud, violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
("DTPA"), and breach of contract and implied warranty. 146 The Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the Texas Residential Construction Liability
Act ("RCLA") does not preempt claims against the builder for breach of
contract, breach of warranty, and fraud, or claims under the DTPA.147
In TA Operating Corp. v. Solar Applications Engineering, Inc.148 the
appellant contracted with appellee to build a truck stop. Various delays
occurred and numerous change orders were issued. Upon substantial
completion, appellee sent appellant a list of items that needed to be done
to complete the building and appellant disputed several of the items. Ap-
pellee then filed suit prior to submitting an all-bills-paid affidavit, a con-
dition precedent to final payment. The issue at hand was whether the
doctrine of substantial performance excuses a contractor's failure to com-
ply with an express condition precedent to final payment when such con-
dition is unrelated to completion of the building.149 The San Antonio
Court of Appeals held that, while the substantial performance doctrine
permitted contractors to sue, it did not ordinarily excuse the non-occur-
rence of an express condition precedent. 150 While appellee was permit-
ted to sue under the contract, appellee did not plead or prove that it
complied with the express condition precedent to final payment and, con-
142. Id. at 248.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 249.
145. 188 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
146. Id. at 401-02.
147. Id. at 405.
148. 191 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. granted).
149. Id. at 176-78.
150. Id. at 180.
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sequently, it did not trigger the duty to pay. 151
In Redland Insurance Co. v. Southwest Stainless, L.P.'52 the insurer
contended that the subcontractor was required to send the copies of no-
tices it sent to the prime contractor and that such notices were required to
be sent by certified mail with return receipt requested. The insurer con-
tended that the subcontractor's failure to do this precluded recovery on
the payment bond. 153 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reasoned that,
because the McGregor Act, chapter 2253 of the Texas Government Code,
was remedial in nature, it should be given the most liberal construction
possible. 154 The court of appeals further reasoned that the notice re-
quirements were satisfied by substantial compliance, despite the fact that
they had been sent by first-class regular mail instead of by certified mail,
because the notices had been sent on time and were timely received. 155
In Jordan v. Hagler,156 Burl and Brenda Hagler, the homeowners,
brought an action against the contractor, John Jordan, to obtain declara-
tory judgment and removal of liens. Contractor filed lis pendens and
counterclaimed for constructive trust. The trial court ordered the re-
moval of the liens and prohibited new ones, ruled against the contractor
on the claim for constructive trust, declared the lis pendens invalid, and
awarded attorney fees to homeowners.1 57 The Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals held that the contractor was not entitled to a constructive trust on
the homestead. 158 A constructive trust is not a trust at all, but an equita-
ble remedy created by the legal system to prevent unjust enrichment, and
its purpose is to right wrongs that cannot be addressed under other legal
theories.1 59 Because the property was the owners' homestead, the court
of appeals found Jordan failed to perfect the liens, agreed to the order
removing the liens and prohibiting new filings, and found that the con-
tractor failed to post bond to stay removal of liens.160 Moreover, the
court of appeals ruled the contractor's attempt to impose a constructive
trust on materials affixed to the homestead ran contrary to the plain lan-
guage of the statute which detailed the method by which an encum-
brance, or lien, could be fixed on a homestead. 161 The court of appeals
stated:
The suit on which the lis pendens is based must claim a direct interest
in the real property, not a collateral one [internal citations omitted].
In the instant case Jordan argues that he has given notice of an inter-
est in the [owners'] property pursuant to section 12.007 because the
151. Id.
152. 181 S.W.3d 509 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
153. Id. at 510-11.
154. Id. at 512.
155. Id.
156. 179 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
157. Id. at 218-19.
158. Id. at 221.
159. Id. at 220.
160. Id. at 219.
161. Id. at 220.
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materials he purchased and used to perform the remediation and re-
construction work on their property are not removable ... and [be-
came] "one with the real property." . . . Jordan did not seek a lien to
recover a judgment, but instead sought a constructive trust ...
Under the particular facts of this case, however, we recognize that
the only means by which Jordan could have asserted an interest in
the property was by obtaining a mechanic's lien .... the trial court
entered an agreed order which removed all liens and prohibited Jor-
dan from filing any further liens .... Accordingly, the lis pendens is
voidable and capable of being cancelled by the trial court because it
gives notice of a claim that is unavailable to Jordan. 162
Finally, the court of appeals rejected the trial court's ruling on attor-
neys fees.163 The court of appeals ruled the homeowners were not enti-
tled to declaratory relief or attorneys fees under the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act.164 The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act has a provi-
sion which permits declaratory relief on construction or validity of a
deed, will, written contract, or other writing constituting a contract.' 65
The court of appeals ruled a lis pendens is not a deed, will, written con-
tract or other writing constituting a contract within the meaning of the
Act.166
X. AD VALOREM TAXATION
In Williams v. County of Dallas,167 a taxpayer appealed a trial court's
finding against her for delinquent ad valorem taxes on the grounds that
the tax statements were not properly certified as public records, she was
unfairly surprised by untimely disclosure of tax statements, and that she
was not the alleged owner of the property. 168 The tax statement was held
to be properly certified because it "contained a certification that it was a
true and correct photocopy of the original record of the Dallas County
Certified Tax Roll now in the lawful custody and possession of the Dallas
County Tax Department" and "it was signed by a Dallas County deputy
tax assessor-collector and contained the county seal. '169 Next the court
of appeals held that a taxpayer is not unfairly surprised where a tax state-
ment is "a certified public record with the seal of the official, the plead-
ings gave taxpayer notice that taxing units were seeking to collect all
unpaid taxes ... and taxpayer had the same access to public records as
taxing units."' 70 Finally, the court of appeals dismissed the taxpayer's
final grounds for appeal because "in a suit to collect delinquent taxes,
non-ownership of property is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded
162. Id. at 221-22.
163. Id. at 222-23.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 222.
166. Id.
167. 194 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
168. Id. at 32.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 32-33.
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or it is waived."' 171
In Devon Energy Production, L.P. v. Hockley County Appraisal Dis-
trict,1 72 Devon Energy sought relief from the district's tax assessment of
its working interest in an oil and gas reservoir located outside of the
county in which the district was located. Devon Energy challenged the
district's authority to assess this way and the Amarillo Court of Appeals
held that the district had the burden to establish that the property lay
within the district's borders, saying "[i]f it cannot, then it cannot lawfully
tax the realty. And, if it cannot lawfully tax the realty, then the appraisal
district has no authority to incorporate the realty into its assessment. 1 73
In American Heritage Apartments, Inc. v. Bowie County Appraisal Dis-
trict,174 the Texarkana Court of Appeals interpreted section 11.182 of the
Texas Tax Code to mean that the taxpayer's exclusive purpose must be to
make its housing available to low- or moderate-income persons, rather
than to mean that the taxpayer must provide housing exclusively for low-
or moderate-income persons. 175
XI. INDEMNITIES
English v. BGP International, Inc.1 7 6 concerned the obligation of one
party, BGP International, Inc. ("BGP"), to defend and indemnify
Cynthia English d/b/a English Land Service and American States Insur-
ance Company ("English") with regard to forty-three suits from various
landowners against English in respect to the unauthorized seismic testing
of their properties. The contract between the two parties provided that
BGP would
[P]rotect, defend, indemnify and hold harmless [English] ... against
loss or damage resulting out of any claim or suit, including trespass
(whether geophysical or surface), property loss or damage, or any
civil fines or penalties imposed ... resulting from operations when
BGP commence[s] field operations without the permit acquisition of
100% of the mineral owners and 100% of the surface owners, or any
claim or suit arising out of the negligent actions or omissions of
BGP. .... 177
The trial court held in favor of BGP on the theory that English's re-
quest for indemnification was premature and not ripe for adjudication
until the underlying suits were resolved. 178 The trial court's decision was
appealed by English on the contention that the contract provided that
BGP was not only obligated to "indemnify" English but was also obli-
gated to defend English, and a duty to defend can arise before liability is
171. Id. at 33-34.
172. 178 S.W.3d 879 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2005, pet. denied).
173. Id. at 883.
174. 196 S.W.3d 850 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied).
175. Id. at 855.
176. 174 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
177. Id. at 368.
178. Id.
2007] 1281
SMU LAW REVIEW
determined. 179 The Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Dis-
trict agreed with English and stated that numerous courts have held that
the duty to defend is a separate obligation from a duty to indemnify and
that the duty to defend is in most situations a justiciable issue. 180 The
court of appeals additionally ruled that.there are even instances where a
party's duty to defend arises even when it is later determined that the
party has no duty to indemnify. 181
XII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. NUISANCE/TRESPASS
In the case of Dominey v. The Unknown Heirs and Legal Representa-
tives of Linda Lokomski, 182 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered
whether certain specific circumstances may constitute a trespass. In 1987,
appellees purchased a home for the combined consideration of cash and a
$23,000 promissory note (secured by a deed of trust and vendor's lien).
Appellants acquired the deed of trust and vendor's liens and entered onto
the property and contracted with a third party for the sale of the home.
When the title search showed that title was still vested in appellees (now
deceased), appellants brought an action for foreclosure on the liens. The
trial court concluded that appellants wrongfully took possession of the
property and committed trespass.1 83 The court of appeals held that ap-
pellants were required to institute foreclosure proceedings in accordance
with the terms of the deed of trust.184 Appellants' insistence that they
had an implied right of possession was not supported by the law. 185
The case of Gleason v. Taub186 involved the issues of standing to claim
trespass and the right to enter land subject to a public easement. Appel-
lants in this case were property owners who brought an action for tres-
pass and damage to property against a construction manager who
destroyed vegetation and removed 16,000 cubic feet of dirt from their
property. The entire property was subject to a public drainage easement.
The construction manager filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending that
appellants did not have standing to sue and moved for summary judg-
ment, arguing that he did not owe any duty to refrain from removing the
dirt because it was subject to a public easement. 187 First, the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals stated that although a public easement grants posses-
sion and control to the public, ownership is not surrendered.1 88 The court
of appeals noted that no Texas case supported the proposition that a fee
179. Id.
180. Id. at 371.
181. Id.
182. 172 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
183. Id. at 69.
184. Id. at 72.
185. Id. at 72-73.
186. 180 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied).
187. Id. at 712-13.
188. Id. at 713.
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owner lacks standing to sue a private party for trespass on private prop-
erty that is subject to a public easement. 189 Appellants therefore had
standing to sue for trespass because their property rights had been ag-
grieved by the alleged wrong. 190 To win summary judgment on this point
the court of appeals stated that he would need to show conclusively that
appellants did not own the property where the alleged trespass took
place. 191 Appellee's own evidence conclusively proved the opposite ac-
cording to the court of appeals.1 92
B. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In In re Drake,193 the San Antonio Court of Appeals considered
whether an attorney violated the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct by representing taxpayers in a suit against an appraisal district
that was his former client. Dennis Drake had represented the Bexar
County Appraisal District for over twenty years before informing the dis-
trict in 2003 that he was ceasing his representation. The following year he
represented two parties in suits challenging the district's valuation of
their properties. The District filed a motion to disqualify Drake on the
basis of Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.09, which pro-
hibits an attorney from representing a party in a matter adverse to a for-
mer client. The trial court granted the motion for disqualification. 94 The
court of appeals overturned the trial court's disqualification order be-
cause the lack of a relationship between Drake's former representation
and the pending litigation meant that no confidential information was at
risk of being revealed.1 95
C. Lis PENDENS
In the case In Re Collins, 96 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals focused
on whether the trial court wrongly voided a notice of lis pendens by look-
ing beyond the pleadings and hearing evidence of the filing parties'
claimed interest in the property at issue. Burk Collins and various other
entities had filed a lis pendens on a retail mall property located in Tarrant
County, Texas, claiming that they owned a fifty percent ownership inter-
est in that property (which had been foreclosed on and later purchased by
Collins' former business partner, Richard Kest). The trial court later
ruled that Collins owned no direct interest in the property and vacated
the lis pendens.' 97 The court of appeals noted that in order to file a valid
lis pendens notice, the suit on which the lis pendens notice is based must
189. Id. at 714.
190. Id. at 715.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 195 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 2006, no pet.).
194. Id. at 234.
195. Id. at 237.
196. 172 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
197. Id. at 290-92.
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claim a direct interest in the real property, not a collateral one. 198 If the
suit seeks a property interest only to secure recovery of damages or other
relief that the plaintiff may be rewarded, then the notice of lis pendens is
not available.199
Collins' pleading alleged a direct interest in the property by stating that
Kest had promised Collins a fifty percent interest in the property in ex-
change for his allowing the property to be foreclosed upon and other va-
rious incentives. Kest, in his motion seeking to vacate the lis pendens,
challenged that Collins never owned a personal interest in the property
because the mall was owned by the partnership entity that Collins and
Kest were partners in and that Collins had specifically waived any interest
in the property in a document signed by Collins. Collins countered this
evidence by providing various memoranda in which Kest acknowledged
that Collins had an interest in the property and that he, Collins, would be
awarded a fifty percent interest if the property was foreclosed upon.20 0
Thus, the court of appeals ruled that there was a question of fact as to
whether Collins' interest in the property was a direct interest and held
that the trial court wrongly voided the lis pendens filing.20 1
In Jordan v. Hagler,20 2 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a
general contractor not only filed a lis pendens notice in violation of a
court order, but also that the general contractor's interest in the property
was not a direct interest. 20 3 Jordan, a general contractor, had performed
various types of construction work at the Haglers' home and had filed
several mechanic's liens against the property when the Haglers refused to
pay Jordan for his work. Due to certain determined defects in the perfec-
tion of the liens, the trial court upheld the removal of the liens and pro-
hibited Jordan from filing any further liens. Jordan then filed a notice of
lis pendens claiming that he owned a direct interest in the property be-
cause the materials he used in the construction had become part of the
property. 20 4 The court of appeals held that his attempt to file a lis
pendens was a way to try to circumvent the trial court's order prohibiting
him from filing further liens.20 5 Furthermore, the court of appeals held
that Jordan had no direct interest in the property, but only a collateral
interest (in that he sought to use the property as security for his
damages).206
198. Id. at 293.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 295-97.
201. Id. at 297.
202. 179 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
203. Id. at 222.
204. Id. at 218-19.
205. Id. at 222.
206. Id.
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D. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
In Pirtle v. Kahn,20 7 an apartment complex tenant brought actions
against the landlord for premises liability, negligence, fraud, and state
Deceptive Trade Practice Act ("DTPA") violations after she discovered
that a mold leak in her apartment had led to her mold related illnesses.
The landlord moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's
actions were barred by each cause of action's respective statute of limita-
tions. The trial court granted the landlord's motion for summary judg-
ment on all causes of action. The tenant appealed.
The limitations period for a claimant to bring a DTPA violation is two
years.208 The cause of action would generally accrue when an injury re-
sults from a wrongful act, regardless of when the plaintiff learned of the
injury.20 9 However, the limited discovery rule provides an exception to
this standard rule when the nature of the injury is inherently undiscover-
able and evidence of the injury is objectively verifiable. 210 In applying
this exception, the courts will determine the point in time at which "the
plaintiff knows, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence
should have discovered, the nature of his injury and the likelihood that it
was caused by the wrongful acts of another. " 21' The landlord argued that
the statute of limitations began to run when the appellant moved into the
apartment complex and became immediately ill. The Houston Court of
Appeals for the First District determined that she "obtained facts suffi-
cient to require her to investigate a causal connection between the mold
and her illnesses ... when she found the leak in her apartment, saw the
mold, and immediately drew the inference that the mold caused her ill-
nesses. '212 The two-year limitations period had passed for the DTPA
case, but the court of appeals sustained appellant's issue with respect to
the fraud claim, which was governed by a four-year statute of limitations
period.21 3
In American Title Co. v. Bomac Mortgage Holdings,214 Bomac Mort-
gage sued American Title of Houston for breach of contract, fraud, viola-
tions of the DTPA, and various other claims arising out of a mortgage
finance transaction in which Bomac was the mortgagee. In July 2000,
Bomac loaned Anthony Norris $288,000 to purchase property in Galves-
ton, Texas. American Title served as escrow agent for the transaction.
Bomac argued that unbeknownst to Bomac, a "flip" of the property took
place and both sales were funded by the loan proceeds. In addition, cer-
tain unauthorized payments were made out of the loan proceeds, and
American Title represented in mortgage documents that Norris paid a
207. 177 S.W.3d 567 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
208. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.565 (Vernon 2002).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Pirtle, 177 S.W.3d at 571.
212. Id. at 573.
213. Id. at 574.
214. 196 S.W.3d 903 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2006, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.).
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down payment, which he had not paid. The fact that a "flip" had tran-
spired was not disputed by the defendant. American Title altered the
title commitment to omit ownership information. The facts were heavily
disputed, but the jury found that American Title had defrauded Bomac,
committed theft, and acted unconscionably. In the second phase of the
bifurcated trial, the jury awarded Bomac $250,000 in punitive damages
under the DTPA for the title company's knowing conduct. 2 15
American Title appealed, arguing that the damages sought by Bomac
were special damages, and were not pleaded properly under rule 56 of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. American Title contended that these
damages were not direct damages from breach of the contract but were
consequential damages. 216 The Dallas Court of Appeals explained that
the cases American Title cited to support its argument that the damages
were consequential damages were breach of contract cases, while the pre-
sent case had been brought under fraud and violations of the DTPA.217
The DTPA allows recovery for actual damages suffered by the consumer
as a result of the deceptive action of the defendant.2 18 Under the DTPA,
the plaintiff can recover direct damages "for loss that is conclusively pre-
sumed to have been foreseen or contemplated by the party as a conse-
quence of its breach of contract or wrongful act under the greater of the
'benefit of the bargain' or the 'out of pocket' measure. ' 219 The court of
appeals determined that the loss was the amount of the loan not repaid
by Norris.220 The fact that Bomac paid this amount over to a third party
subject to a contract of which the Title Company was not aware did not
change the characterization of this loss. 22 1
American Title also challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury's verdict regarding unconscionability, causation, dam-
ages, and conspiracy. As to the unconscionability claim, the DTPA de-
fines an unconscionable action or course of action as "an act or practice
which, to a consumer's detriment, takes advantage of the lack of knowl-
edge, ability, experience, or capacity of the consumer to a grossly unfair
degree. '2 22 When determining whether the defendant's conduct is un-
conscionable, the courts look at the transaction as a whole. 223 "Grossly
unfair degree" means a consumer shows that "the resulting unfairness
was glaringly noticeable, flagrant, complete and unmitigated. ' 224 Ameri-
can Title argued that Bomac's level of knowledge of the situation (Ameri-
can Title argued that Bomac did not rely on the altered title commitment
but had the altered HUD-1 form showing, among other things, payment
215. Id. at 906-07.
216. Id. at 910.
217. Id. at 911.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 914.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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of rent for the personal place of an employee) and its industry sophistica-
tion negated the finding of unconscionability against the title company.
The court of appeals found that there was enough evidence from which
the jury could have determined it was unfair to Bomac, even as an exper-
ienced mortgage lender, for American Title to obtain the loan funds by
concealing the nature of the transaction, and that such unfairness was
glaringly noticeable, flagrant, complete and unmitigated. 225
In Main Place Custom Homes v. Honaker,226 homeowners sued the
construction company (owned by Ron Smith), which built their home,
and the construction company's owner after the home and property was
damaged because of slope failure and related soil movement. Appellants
argued that the facts supported the finding that the sprinkler installer was
the primary cause of the slope failure. A plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's actions were the "producing cause" of the plaintiff's injuries
to prevail on a DTPA case.2 27 Producing cause means that the acts of the
defendant were both the cause-in-fact and a substantial factor in the in-
jury.228 There may be more than one producing cause. 229 After review-
ing the evidence, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals determined that there
were several causes of the injury to the Honakers, and therefore, held
that the evidence could support the percentages of responsibility. 230
One important contention made by the appellants was that the evi-
dence of the case did not legally and factually support the trial court's
findings that appellants violated the DTPA. Appellants argued that the
evidence did not support a violation of any of the laundry list violations
set forth in subsections 5, 7, 12, 13, 20, and 24 of section 17.46 of the
DTPA. The DTPA prohibits "[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."'231 To recover under
the DTPA, a plaintiff must show that he or she was a consumer, the de-
fendant engaged in a false, misleading, or deceptive act, and the act con-
stituted a producing cause of economic damages or damages for mental
anguish. 232 Section 17.46(b) of the DTPA sets forth the ways in which
one can engage in false or misleading practices for purposes of a DTPA
claim.233 The appellants' main argument hinged on characterizing the
statements that Smith made to the Honakers about the stability of the
home and the soil as statements of opinion and not misrepresentations of
fact. Appellants also pointed out that some of the laundry list items re-
quired that defendant knowingly and intentionally made the misrepresen-
tations. The appellants argued that the evidence showed Smith had no
intent to misrepresent the stability of the home or any knowledge that
225. Id.
226. 192 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
227. Id. at 616.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 619-20.
231. Id. at 623.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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what he said was untrue. 234
The court of appeals noted that misiepresentations are actionable
under the DTPA "so long as they are of a material fact and not merely
'puffing' or opinion. ' 235 The court of appeals looked at three factors in
making this distinction: (1) the specificity versus the vagueness of the
statement; (2) the comparative knowledge of the buyer and seller; and (3)
whether the representation relates to a past or current event or condition
versus a future event or condition.2 36 The court of appeals found: (1)
Smith's direct statements regarding the stability of the home and the
property's ability to support the home and the fill dirt were very specific
and not vague; (2) Smith as the representative of the homebuilder was in
a better position to know about the condition of the home as opposed to
the Honakers (who were both physicians); (3) although this was Smith's
first multimillion dollar home and he relied on the engineers to interpret
the reports given to him by the developer, he had been building homes
for several years; and (4) Smith's representations about the home applied
both to the present and future condition of the home.237
In another point of error, the appellants argued that the evidence was
legally and factually insufficient to support a finding that they knowingly
committed one of the laundry list violations. A finding of knowledge is a
prerequisite to an award for mental anguish under the DTPA.238 The
plaintiff
must show that the misrepresentations were made with "actual
awareness, at the time of the act or practice complained of, of the
falsity, deception or unfairness of the act or practice giving rise to the
consumers claim, or in an action brought under Subdivision (2) of
Subsection (a) of Section 17.50 [breach of express or implied war-
ranty], actual awareness of the act, practice, condition, defect, or fail-
ure constituting the breach of warranty, but actual awareness may be
inferred where objective manifestations indicate that a person acted
with actual awareness. '2 39
Smith argued that he did not know that his statements were false and
depended on his engineer's interpretation of the engineering reports con-
cerning the land report. The appellees argued that appellants' receipt of
an engineering report (not given to appellees but given to appellant by
the developer), which highlighted potential problems regarding the stabil-
ity of the soil and home placement, conferred knowledge of the property
conditions on the appellant. The Honakers' engineer, however, testified
that the report in question would have raised red flags to most engineers
familiar with the formations on which the property was built.240 The
234. Id. at 624.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 624-25.
238. Id. at 625.
239. Id. (citing TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(9) (Vernon 2002)).
240. Id. at 626.
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court of appeals held that there was no evidence that anyone other than
an engineer would have been alerted by the report to a problem with the
soil's stability and sustained this portion of appellants' argument. 241
E. PREMISES LIABILITY
In Rueda v. Paschal,242 the Houston Court of Appeals for the First Dis-
trict addressed the interpretation of a statute relating to a landowner's
liability for dangerous conditions on the landowner's property that harm
contractors or subcontractors. The Paschals owned a ranch and hired a
contractor to perform certain construction work on the ranch. The con-
tractor hired a subcontractor, and the subcontractor hired several work-
ers, including Rueda. The subcontractor directed Rueda to retrieve
Paschal's tools from Paschal's basement. Rueda used a wooden ladder
supplied by Paschal to enter the basement and retrieve the tools. As
Rueda climbed back up the ladder from the basement, the ladder slipped
and Rueda fell to the concrete floor, sustaining injuries. Rueda sued the
Paschals. The Paschals filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging
that Rueda had not satisfied the requirements of section 95.003 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The trial court granted the Pas-
chals' motion for summary judgment and Rueda appealed.24 3 Section
95.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code ("TCPRC") pro-
tects a property owner from liability for personal injury, death or prop-
erty damage to a contractor, subcontractor or their employees unless: (1)
the property owner exercises or retains control over the manner in which
the work is performed (other than the commencement, cessation or in-
spection of work or the right to receive reports); or (2) the property
owner had actual knowledge of the danger or condition resulting in per-
sonal injury, death or property damage and failed to adequately warn the
contractor, subcontractor or their employee.244
The court of appeals first addressed the issue of whether the Paschals
had knowledge of the danger that caused Rueda's injuries. Rueda
claimed that the language of the statute required knowledge by the prop-
erty owner of a danger or condition, and that the Paschals' knowledge of
the ladder presented a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat
the motion for summary judgment.2 45 The court of appeals noted that
Rueda did not provide any evidence that the Paschals had knowledge of
any danger. 246 The court of appeals cited a prior court decision in con-
cluding that a property owner is only required to warn of dangers and
that knowledge of the existence of the ladder did not constitute knowl-
edge of a dangerous condition under section 95.003.247
241, Id.
242. 178 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
243. Id. at 108-09.
244. Id. at 109.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 109-10.
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Rueda additionally claimed that TCPRC section 95.003 required the
Paschals to prove (in connection with and response to the motion for
summary judgment) that they lacked knowledge of both the "danger"
and "condition" relating to the property. Rueda argued that a property
owner is shielded from liability only if it had actual knowledge of the
danger or condition resulting in the injury, and that at trial Rueda would
only have to prove that the Paschals had knowledge of either the danger
or condition in order to remove the protections of TCPRC section 95.003
from the Paschals. The court of appeals reviewed prior interpretations of
the knowledge component of TCPRC section 95.003 and determined that
the prior case law interpreted "danger or condition" to mean a "danger-
ous condition. '248 Based on prior case law and its review of the statute in
context, the court of appeals concluded that the statute requires the prop-
erty owner to have knowledge of a danger or dangerous condition in or-
der for the protections of the statute to be removed. 249
Finally, Rueda argued that the Paschals were required to establish the
satisfaction of all of the elements of TCPRC section 95.003 as an affirma-
tive defense in order to be shielded from liability. The court of appeals
determined that the burden of proof in showing "control" and "knowl-
edge" by the property owner under TCPRC section 95.003 rests with the
plaintiff, and not the defendant. 250 Accordingly, the defendant has the
burden of proving the applicability of chapter 95 of TCPRC to the claim,
but the plaintiff has the burden of proving control and knowledge under
TCPRC section 95.003.251
In Parker v. 2081, Inc.,252 the Houston Court of Appeals for the Four-
teenth District considered whether the Dram Shop Act (section 2.03 of
the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code) precluded the common law cause of
action for premises liability. Parker, an intoxicated patron of a pool hall,
was asked by the manager to leave the pool hall (owned by 20801, Inc.
["20801"]), and later engaged in a fight with Griffin, another intoxicated
pool hall patron, in the pool hall parking lot, resulting in serious injuries
to Parker. Parker sued 20801 under the Dram Shop Act and for premises
liability, alleging that 20801 breached its duty to Parker to exercise rea-
sonable care. Parker alleged four ways that 20801 was negligent in con-
nection with his injuries. 20801 filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing, among other points, that the Dram Shop Act prohibited Parker's
common law causes of action. The trial court granted 20801's motion for
summary judgment (without specifying the grounds for such grant), and
Parker appealed. 253
The Dram Shop Act imposes liability on providers of alcoholic bever-
ages for the actions of their intoxicated customers under certain circum-
248. Id. at 110.
249. Id. at 110-11.
250. Id. at 111.
251. Id.
252. 194 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. granted).
253. Id. at 558-59.
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stances described in sections 2.01 and 2.02 of the Texas Alcoholic
Beverage Code.254 However, section 2.03 of the Dram Shop Act states
that the liability of alcohol providers under the Dram Shop Act is "in lieu
of common law or other statutory law warranties and duties" and is the
"exclusive cause of action" for providing an alcoholic beverage to a per-
son eighteen years of age or older.255
After explaining the causes of action in the Dram Shop Act, the court
of appeals noted that no other court had addressed the "exclusivity" lan-
guage in the Dram Shop Act in the context of premises liability.25 6 How-
ever, the court of appeals analyzed Texas Supreme Court and various
other court decisions involving both the Dram Shop Act and other com-
mon law causes of action, and determined that courts have "clearly" held
that the Dram Shop Act prohibits common law causes of action against
an alcohol provider that is liable under the Dram Shop Act.2 57 While the
court of appeals recognized that a defendant has a duty to prevent the
criminal acts of third parties when the criminal conduct is foreseeable, it
held that the plain language of the Dram Shop Act, stating that the liabil-
ity of an alcohol provider is "in lieu of common law or other statutory law
warranties and duties," precluded Parker's premises liability claim against
20801.258
F. BROKERS
There were no noteworthy cases concerning brokers for this Survey
period.
254. Id. at 560.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 560-62.
258. Id. at 562-63.
2007] 1291
1292 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
